The US is the Nuclear Threat
• Enrichment Suspension Not on Iran's Agenda
• Position of Iranian UN Delegation on Resolution 1696
Commentary
• Security Council Resolution 1696 on Iran
• Little Chance of Nuclear Compromise
Free the Cuban Five
• Join the September 23 Action in DC!
• Cuban Five Political Prisoners Opposed Terrorism
• Statement from Cuba's Parliament on Cuban Five Case
Enrichment Suspension Not on Iran's Agenda
Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid-Reza Asefi said on August 20 that Tehran will not suspend its nuclear enrichment activities. "Suspension is not on Iran's agenda because we regard it as a return to the past," Asefi told reporters at his weekly press briefing.
Iran has said that it will formally respond by August 22 to a set of proposals made by the European Union trio of France, Britain and Germany and backed by the United States, Russia and China. The six have offered Iran a package of economic and political incentives in return for a suspension of uranium enrichment by Tehran. Asefi rejected any preconditions for starting up negotiations on Iran's nuclear program, saying, "Preconditions make any discussion pointless."
Western powers say Iran must halt the atomic work before talks can start. "A few people cannot decide for the whole world," he said. If the Islamic Republic wanted to accept the Western preconditions, it would have resumed negotiations much sooner, the spokesman noted. He added it is impossible to reach a conclusion when preconditions are involved.
A UN security council resolution passed on July 31 orders Iran to suspend uranium enrichment by August 31 or face possible sanctions. "We've never had any problem with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections and the regional countries have no worry about Iran's nuclear program because Iran's development will benefit them as well as the Islamic countries," he explained.
Turning to Israel's war against Lebanon which came to a halt last week, Asefi said that, "Israel is the main cause of tension in the region. Even some fair Western politicians confirmed Hezbollah's legal resistance, but Israel showed no respect for the international law and ignored the world's public opinion."
He said that Israel has violated the ceasefire which means the Zionist regime has no interest in stopping hostilities. He described Hezbollah's victory as a turning point in international relations, developments in Lebanon and also the "beginning of Israel's wane." Asefi added that Iran is ready to help the Lebanese people reconstruct their country.
"The preliminary talks have been held and we have yet to make a comprehensive decision in this regard," he added.
Tehran Times, August 21, 2006
China Opposes Using Sanctions Against Iran
On August 22, China announced -opposition to any sanctions against Iran because they "cannot fully solve the problems," a senior official said. "The Chinese government's position on the Iranian nuclear issue is very clear," said Sun Bigan, China's special envoy to the Middle East. "We have all along stood for a peaceful settlement of the issue through negotiations, rather than resorting to force or threatening sanctions," Sun told reporters. He said sanctions could create tensions "detrimental not only to the region but also to ourselves."
Islamic Republic News Agency. August 22, 2006
Venezuela Opposed to Hindrance of Iran's Nuclear Program
Venezuelan Vice President Jose Vicente Rangel on August 20 declared that his country is against preventing the development of a nuclear program in Iran. Speaking to reporters in Caracas, he said that Venezuela does not agree with halting Iran's nuclear production which is not aimed at production of atomic bombs. "This is while India is involved in producing nuclear bombs with U.S. approval and Pakistan is developing its nuclear program," he added.
Rangel accused the U.S. of approaching the nuclear activities of other countries based on its own interests. "Development of the nuclear program of world countries creates no problem if it is approved by Washington, while in the case another country proceeds with the same, it will cause problems.
"Venezuela has its own foreign policy and does not intend to confront the U.S. But we will never accept the U.S. telling us what is right and what is wrong," he added.
The vice president called for expansion of multifaceted mutual ties and said, "Given that Iran is a developed country in the field of advanced technologies and has achieved great progress in the automotive industry, Venezuela will benefit from bilateral relations."
Rangel pointed to the joint establishment of a tractor manufacturing plant called Veniran, which is more to the interest of his country.
Islamic Republic News Agency, August 21, 2006
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Uranium Enrichment Program is Not a Threat
Position of Iranian UN Delegation on Resolution 1696
The article below is based on statements by Iran's UN Ambassador Javad Zarif, as published in a July 31 UN Security Council press release on the passing of Resolution 1696. The resolution demands that Iran suspend uranium enrichment by August 31 or face possible economic and diplomatic sanctions. Zarif said Iran, the concerned party in the UN resolution, had not been permitted to speak before the Security council.
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UN Ambassador Javad Zarif said it was not the first time that Iran's endeavors to stand on its own feet and make technological advances had faced the stiff resistance and concerted pressure of some powers permanently represented in the council. Iran's struggle to nationalize its oil industry had been touted in a draft resolution submitted in October 1951 by Britain and supported by the United States and France as a threat to international peace and security. That draft had preceded a coup d'état, organized by the United States and Britain, in a less veiled attempt to restore their shortsighted interests. More recently, Saddam Hussein's massive invasion of Iran in 1980 had not troubled the same permanent members to consider it a threat to international peace and security.
Over the past several weeks, the council had been prevented from moving to stop the massive aggression against the Palestinian and Lebanese people and the resulting terrible humanitarian crises, Zarif said. The council would not have the slightest chance of addressing the oppressor's nuclear arsenal. Likewise, the council had been prevented from reacting to the daily threats of resort to force against Iran uttered at the highest levels by the United States, the Britain and the lawless Israeli regime, in violation of the Charter. On the other hand, in the past few years, a few big powers had spared no efforts in turning the Security council into a tool for attempting to prevent Iran from exercising its inalienable right to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, recognized explicitly under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
The people and government of Iran were determined to exercise their inalienable right to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and build on their own scientific advances in developing various peaceful aspects of that technology, Zarif continued. At the same time, as victims of the use of weapons of mass destruction, they rejected the development and use of all those inhumane weapons on ideological, as well as strategic grounds. Iran's leader had issued a public and categorical religious decree against the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons. Iran had also clearly stressed that nuclear weapons had no place in its military doctrine.
Zarif noted that in order to dispel any doubt about its peaceful nuclear program, Iran had enabled International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to carry out a series of inspections, which had amounted to the most robust inspection of any IAEA member state, including more than 2,000 inspection days in the past three years, the signing of the Additional Protocol on December 18, 2003 and implementing it immediately, until February 6, 2006, the submission of more than 1,000 pages of declarations in accordance with the Additional Protocol, and permitting inspectors to investigate baseless allegations, by taking the unprecedented step of providing repeated access to military sites.
Consequently, Zarif said, all IAEA reports since November 2003 had been indicative of the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear program. In November of that year, IAEA had confirmed that "to date, there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities were related to a nuclear weapons program." The same can be found in other IAEA reports, as recent as February 2006.
Much had been made, included in today's resolution, of a statement by IAEA that it was not yet in a position to conclude that there were no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran, he said. The sponsors had ignored, however, the repeated acknowledgement by the IAEA Director General that the process of drawing such a conclusion was a time-consuming process. They had also ignored the addendum to the 2005 IAEA Safeguards Implementation Report, released in June 2006, which indicated that 45 other countries were in the same category as Iran, including 14 European and several members of the council.
Iran's peaceful nuclear program posed no threat to international peace and security, he said. Dealing with the issue in the council was, therefore, unwarranted and void of any legal basis or practical utility. Far from reflecting the international community's concerns, the approach of the sponsors flouted the stated position of the overwhelming majority of the international community, clearly reflected in the most recent statements by foreign ministers of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and partly reflected in the June 2006 IAEA Board Chairman's conclusion.
Today's action by the council - which was the culmination of those efforts aimed at making the suspension of uranium enrichment mandatory - violated the fundamental principles of international law, the NPT and IAEA resolutions. It also ran counter to the views of the majority of United Nations' member states, which the council is obliged to represent. The sole reason for pushing the council to take action was that Iran had decided, after over two years of negotiations, to resume the exercise of its inalienable right to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, by partially reopening its fully safeguarded facilities and ending a voluntary suspension. Iran's right to enrich uranium was recognized under the NPT. And, upholding the right of states parties to international aggreements was as essential as ensuring respect for their obligations. Those requirements, including the NPT, were sustained by a balance between rights and obligations. Threats would not sustain the NPT or other international agreements. Ensuring that members could draw rightful benefits from membership, and non-members were not rewarded for their intransigence, did.
Yet, exactly the opposite is the trend today, Zarif said. Today, the world was witness to a dangerous trend. While members of the NPT were denied their rights and punished, those who defied the NPT, particularly the perpetrators of current carnage in Lebanon and Palestine, were rewarded by generous nuclear cooperation agreements.
The trend, he added, had reached a horrendous, and indeed ridiculous, state with the Israeli regime. That regime, a non-member of the NPT, whose nuclear arsenal was coupled with its expansionist, repressive and state-terror policies, was repeatedly recognized as the most serious threat to regional and international peace and security. Yet, it had the audacity to cry wolf about Iran's peaceful nuclear program and lead a global campaign of threats, lies, deception, pressure, blackmail and outright extortion. In spite of the massive political and propaganda machine, no one in today's world could accept the convoluted logic that it was okay for some to have nuclear weapons, while others were prevented from developing nuclear energy. [ ]
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Commentary
Security Council Resolution 1696 on Iran
Balking at Iran's request to be allowed until August 22 to respond to the proposal put forward on June 6 by the permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany, the Security Council passed resolution 1696, making mandatory Iran's suspension of all enrichment-related activities and reprocessing activities, including research and development. In our view, this was an unwise course of action. A better approach would have been to await Iran's response to the June proposal of the P5/Germany.
The resolution tabled by the UK and France resumed Security Council engagement in the question of Iran's nuclear program, put on hiatus after the two countries circulated a similar resolution in May. The May draft resolution was put aside due to disagreements among the P5 and in order to undertake another effort to resuscitate negotiations. On June 6, the P5 plus Germany presented Iran with a package of incentives, intended to persuade Iran to suspend indefinitely its uranium enrichment program and construction of a heavy water reactor. After becoming impatient with the length of time Iran required for responding to the proposal, earlier this month (July 6) the P5 states plus Germany decided to refer the matter back to the Security Council. The stumbling block for commencement of negotiations appeared to be the proposal's precondition of suspension of the enrichment program.
Spurred by the U.S./E3, the Council has now undercut what might be the last opportunity to achieve a negotiated solution without confrontation. The first casualty of the Council's decision to escalate the situation will likely be the June proposal. Prior to the Council's action, Iran's foreign ministry stated, "if any resolution is issued against Iran the package would be left off the agenda by Iran," adding that it would "confront the region with more tension." The Iranians have unequivocally stated that they would not be compelled to comply with any resolution making suspension mandatory, thereby almost guaranteeing the continued escalation of the situation.
Qatar, the lone Arab state on the Security Council, sharing the belief that the Council's action on Iran would increase tension in the region, provided the single vote opposed to the resolution. Despite its concerns over Iran's nuclear intentions and its close proximity across the Persian Gulf from Iran's nuclear power plant under construction at Bushehr, the Qatari ambassador stated that he did not approve of the Council proceeding with the resolution while the region was "in flames." He further added that there would be no harm in waiting a few days to assess Iran's willingness to cooperate, especially in light of the fact that Iran has not yet rejected the proposal.
The Resolution
Resolution 1696 provides that the Security Council is acting "under Article 40 of Chapter VII of the United Nations in order to make mandatory the suspension required by the IAEA." Article 40 concerns interim measures aimed at preventing "aggravation" of a situation the Council has determined to pose a threat to the peace under Article 39. Departing from an orthodox reading of the Charter, the curious formulation employed by the present resolution utilizes Article 40 to make binding the Security Council's demands upon Iran. U.S. Ambassador Bolton foreshadowed this unusual move in a Security Council Stakeout on July 25, saying: "I think what you're going to see increasingly is wording that's different in the resolutions and that the notion that you have to have an 'abbra cadabra' in a resolution to make it binding. It may be good practice, but it's not a requirement. There are a variety of ways in which the Security Council can manifest the intent to adopt a binding resolution, and I think that is likely to be the pattern in the future."
The use of Article 40 makes the resolution less emphatic in its invocation of Chapter VII of the Charter than the May draft. The reference to Article 39 was deleted, which Russia reportedly wanted done, apparently in order to lessen the impact of the resolution as a Chapter VII matter that could eventually lead to use of force. Notably the word "threat" is entirely absent in the resolution. Again, under an orthodox view of the UN Charter, a binding resolution under Chapter VII requires a finding, under Article 39, that a given situation constitutes a "threat to international peace and security." Such a finding under Article 39 also grants the Security Council the authority to adopt sanctions under Article 41 or employ military force under Article 42. Previous drafts of the present resolution stated in their preambular paragraphs that the Council was "mindful" of the threat presented by Iran's nuclear program. Also striking is that the word "decides" appears nowhere in the resolution, another softening of its tone.
As the culmination of U.S. efforts to make Iran's suspension mandatory, operative paragraph 2 of the resolution demands (instead of "decides") "that Iran shall suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development." Remarkably, this provision drops the provision to include a demand for Iran to also halt construction of the heavy water reactor at Arak. Reactors of such designs are more ideal for harvesting weapons-grade plutonium than the light water reactors Iran is constructing as part of its nuclear power program. Although the issue of the heavy water reactor has not garnered much attention in the media, it represents at least as large a proliferation risk as Iran's beleaguered enrichment program. The decision to focus exclusively on the issue of enrichment, the sole issue that Iran has declared to be its red line, seems suspect if the true intention of the Security Council is to prevent an aggravation of the situation. Despite the stated intention of Article 40 it is questionable whether the present action taken by the Security Council will help to prevent an aggravation of the situation.
The present resolution does not impose sanctions on Iran. It provides that absent compliance by Iran, measures not involving the use of force will be considered -- i.e., economic sanctions -- under Article 41, underlining "that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary." The resolution thus seeks to avoid any implication that use of force may be warranted as a response. This is to the good, especially given the way the United States and United Kingdom abused past Council resolutions in their attempts to justify their invasion of Iraq.
Ironically, despite the rush for the Council to take action against Iran, the deadline for compliance is August 31, nine days after Iran said it would provide a response to the proposal, August 22. This raises the question, mentioned by the Qatari ambassador, of why the Council chose to act now in lieu of waiting three weeks for the Iran's response to the proposal. As discussed below, the urgency of this resolution is artificial, seems likely to aggravate the situation, despite the invocation of Article 40, and takes on a somewhat sinister air in light of the Council's ongoing inability to take meaningful action, due to the U.S. position, to respond to the violence in Lebanon, Gaza and Israel.
The resolution seems to represent a sort of bridge between Chapter VI and Chapter VII. Chapter VI of the Charter provides that in situations "the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security," the Council may "recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment." The resolution just adopted on Iran leans in this direction in lack of a finding a finding of a threat to the peace, its virtual exclusion of the possibility of Council authorized use of force, and in its reference to the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution. The resolution adopts elements of Chapter VII in its identification of the possibility of sanctions should Iran not comply with the Council's directives. Some would say that, despite the lack of the word "decides," it also draws on Chapter VII in imposing requirements on Iran, which is not explicitly contemplated by Chapter VI. However, it can also be argued that Article 25 of the Charter, providing that states agree to carry out the decisions of the Security Council, and the Charter as a whole confer authority on the Council to make binding decisions whether or not a finding of a threat to the peace is made under Chapter VII. Conceivably, the resolution represents an evolution in Security Council practice in responding to issues of compliance with a non-proliferation/disarmament regime that do not rise to the level of threats to international peace and security.
Policy Considerations
As noted above, Article 40 is tied to Article 39 as part of Chapter VII, and unless the resolution truly is a new species, therefore implies a finding of a threat to security. However, contrary to the insistence of some states on pursuing this matter in the Security Council under Chapter VII, there is no basis for a finding of a threat to international peace and security. According to the IAEA, independent experts and the director of U.S. Intelligence, Iran remains several years away from the capability to produce HEU for single weapon, and likely at least a decade away from the capability to deploy an arsenal of deliverable weapons, should it choose to do so.
Despite the lack of an imminent threat posed by Iran's present enrichment research program, the single-minded objective of the present draft is make mandatory what had been regarded until recently as voluntary, non-binding, confidence-building measures (see for example the IAEA board's September 2005 resolution). In its March 2006 safeguards report on Iran [GOV/2006/27] the IAEA made the unusual effort to stress that "safeguards obligations and confidence building measures are different, distinct and not interchangeable." The report further states that "the implementation of confidence building measures" which has been the focus of UN Security Council action, "is no substitute for the full implementation at all times of safeguards obligations." The IAEA thus suggests that confidence building measures, such as the suspension of enrichment activities, are not as important as the safeguards, the purpose of which is to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to military use.
The resolution assumes that the IAEA Board "required" Iran to suspend its enrichment related activities. However, it is doubtful that the Board has this authority under the IAEA Statute. Furthermore, while clever drafting of the IAEA Board's February 4 resolution has obscured the matter, it falls well short of imposing "requirements" upon Iran. In the first operative paragraph, the Board refers to the need to build confidence and "deems it necessary" for Iran to take certain steps. Operative paragraph 5 refers to "non-legally binding" and "voluntary" confidence building measures.
The resolution also refers to the fact that the IAEA has not yet been able to determine the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran. However, the IAEA certifies the absence of undeclared nuclear activities only for states that implement the Additional Protocol. For Iran the IAEA has stated this process will take longer due to the history of concealed nuclear activities. The IAEA statement that it is "not yet in a position to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities," which is presently true for Iran, is also true for 40 other states including Canada, the Czech Republic, and South Africa. This statement is also true for Brazil, which has not signed an Additional Protocol, and, almost unnoticed, began operation of its first commercial scale enrichment plant this year. For some it is tempting to declare, based on the inability of the IAEA to presently draw a conclusion on the absence of nuclear activities, that Iran continues to operate concealed facilities and that any such facilities must be for a military program. But the IAEA has cautioned that the lack of a conclusion does not imply suspicion of undeclared nuclear materials and activities, as the matter is frequently spun in the media and by some governments.
Finally, it should be understood that since Iran's failures to report nuclear activities over nearly two decades came to light in 2002, Iran has in fact substantially cooperated with the IAEA to rectify those failures. IAEA Director ElBaradei, speaking to the Carnegie Non-Proliferation Conference last November, said: "Over the past two and one-half years, we have compiled a detailed picture of most aspects of Iran's past and current nuclear programme." ElBaradei went on to say that there still remain issues to be clarified, and that transparency from Iran is therefore essential. That part of the story is well known; it also must be grasped that Iran has been cooperating to the extent that ElBaradei could refer to development of a "detailed picture of most aspects" of Iran's program.
Looking Forward
Despite its almost certain guarantee to aggravate the matter, from the interpretation of the resolution expressed by the Russians, Iran does have an incentive to take immediate steps to help deescalate the situation. The Russian Ambassador stated that the resolution should be viewed as an interim measure, intended to facilitate the IAEA's ability to conclude its investigation into Iran's past nuclear activities and to clarify all outstanding issues. According to this view, the Security Council has linked the matter of suspension to the IAEA process. Since Iran revoked its voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol, the IAEA has noted that it has been unable to follow-up on and make progress in its investigation, and to work toward drawing a conclusion that no undeclared nuclear activities or material exist in Iran. If Iran were to ratify the Additional Protocol and make rapid progress toward facilitating the conclusion of the IAEA investigation, it could go a long way toward restoring confidence in its intentions, regardless of the status of its enrichment program. More generally, despite its understandable resentment of the high-handedness of the Security Council, Iran would be well advised, and the non-proliferation regime would be well served, if it were to suspend enrichment throughout the duration of negotiations, and enter into negotiations as proposed in the package, which does appear to promise real benefits for Iran's cooperation. At the present juncture, this does not appear a likely outcome in the near term.
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Little Chance of Nuclear Compromise
Tehran will respond to the pending European package but is unlikely to suspend enrichment under pressure. What the world must realize is sanctions will take us further from and not closer to a peaceful solution.
In 1983, some 20 years before Iran was accused by the United States and its allies of having a clandestine nuclear fuel enrichment program, Tehran approached the International Atomic Energy Agency with a request for technical assistance in setting up a pilot plant for the production of uranium hexafluoride (UF6).
UF6 is the basic feedstock in the uranium enrichment process, in which the gas is spun through centrifuge machines in order to produce low enriched uranium for reactors -- or highly enriched uranium for bombs. At the time, Iran was specifically interested in restarting work begun in the Shah's period on converting U308 into UO2 pellets and then going on to set up a pilot facility for UF6 production.
Since the IAEA Statute commits the agency to provide technical assistance to member states, a team of experts travelled to Iran to interact with scientists at Entec, the Iranian atomic establishment set up in 1974 with French assistance to work on the fuel cycle. According to an account provided by Mark Hibbs in Nuclear Fuel, one of the most authoritative newsletters of the international nuclear industry, the IAEA experts recommended that the agency assist Entec to help their scientists overcome their lack of practical experience. They also suggested that the IAEA provide expert services in a number of areas including the fuel cycle.
But the promised IAEA help never materialized. According to Mr. Hibbs: "Sources said that when in 1983 the recommendations of an IAEA mission to Iran were passed on to the IAEA's technical cooperation program, the U.S. government then 'directly intervened' to discourage the IAEA from assisting Iran in production of UO2 and UF6. 'We stopped that in its tracks,' said a former U.S. official." Rebuffed by the IAEA, Iran signed an agreement with Argentina, only to have Washington force Buenos Aires to back off in 1992. Five years later, the Clinton administration got China to abandon its official assistance to Iran on the fuel cycle.
It is worth recalling this history because it helps us to understand a core concern at the heart of the current crisis over Iran's nuclear program: If Iran's intentions were peaceful, why did it go about its enrichment program with so much secrecy? True, its safeguards agreement did not require it to declare the enrichment facility it was building at Natanz to the IAEA until six months before nuclear material was to be introduced into them. But the "concealed" nature of the facility and the furtiveness of its acquisitions program have led some to conclude that Tehran secretly intended to make bombs. Even if not everyone believes that, many countries feel Iran should suspend all enrichment activity as a confidence-building measure until the IAEA concludes that there are no undeclared nuclear activities in the country.
The Iranian response is one of bewilderment and even anger. When Iran openly sought to develop the fuel cycle and the IAEA was willing to help it, the U.S. intervened to stop this. Whenever Tehran signed a public agreement with an international partner, Washington worked overtime to kill it.
Given this reality, the only way to build a fuel cycle program -- even if one's aims were purely peaceful -- would have been to go about it with stealth. But today, this stealth, which was imposed on Iran at a time when there was no evidence of non-civilian use, is being cited as evidence of malafide intention and as the main reason why Iran must agree to suspend enrichment immediately.
This week, the Iranian Government is likely to provide a formal response to the package of proposals presented to it by the European Union and five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council in June.
Security Council Deadline
Though Iran had indicated its willingness to revert to the EU by August 22, the United States unnecessarily upped the ante by getting the UNSC to pass Resolution 1696 last month threatening Tehran with sanctions if it did not suspend all nuclear enrichment activity by August 31. "I can't understand the logic of the resolution," a senior Western diplomat based in Tehran told The Hindu earlier this month. "When they are saying they will give an answer by a certain date, why impose an ultimatum of this kind?"
"Having trust in each other is essential," Vice-President Esfandiar Rahim Mashaii told The Hindu, "but peaceful enrichment is our right and there can be no compromise." When his attention was drawn to a statement by Joschka Fischer in Tehran that week that Europe recognized Iran's rights but wanted trust to be re-established, Dr. Mashaii said the former Foreign Minister of Germany was not being honest. "When we wanted to build the Bushehr reactor and Russia agreed to cooperate, they put pressure on Russia not to do this work ... Why was Germany against this? They did not give us the right to even use fuel. But now that we have the ability to produce that fuel, they say, 'Don't produce it, we will give it to you!' Are they telling the truth? Whenever we retreat, they advance, and when we go forward, they retreat."
According to a prominent Tehran-based analyst, who spoke to The Hindu on condition of anonymity, the nuclear question has become a national issue in which "the right to enrichment is equated with Mossadegh's oil nationalization and the same group of imperialist countries is being seen as denying Iran control over its energy security." The analyst, who has environmental concerns about Iran going down the nuclear route and is also opposed to President Ahmadinejad's confrontationist style, says the nuclear issue is just an excuse for the U.S. "In the Shah's time, Iran had even more oil per capita than it does now, but there were no objections to our nuclear program. Essentially, the nuclear issue is being used to put pressure on Iran to change its foreign policy, especially towards Israel and the peace process. For example, the U.S. is not pressing Pakistan to even slow down its nuclear weapons program despite the fact that they are the ones who have had ties to non-state actors."
The analyst believes the Iranian leadership is not particularly perturbed by the threat of sanctions. But the U.S. needs to realise pressure will only lead to a hardening of attitudes. "Even if we had a clandestine program, as they claim," he said, "I am certain this did not exist prior to 2000. But post 9/11, the 'Axis of Evil' speech and the invasion of Iraq -- all of this has strengthened the hands of those who say Iran cannot trust the IAEA/U.N. system. In fact, some say the Bush-Blair policy was to use the IAEA and U.N. to ensure Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction before they concluded it was 'safe' to invade."
There are some in Iran -- notably Hosein Shariatmadari, publisher and editor of Kayhan -- who say the country should quit the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) but the broad consensus within the ruling establishment is still in favor of dialogue and diplomacy. "I think the Iranian leaders want to resolve this peacefully... but want an honorable outcome which won't harm Iran's prestige."
For many Iranians, Israel's attack on Lebanon marked the opening round of an American-led military-political campaign aimed first, at forcing Tehran to abandon its civilian enrichment program, and eventually at bringing about 'regime change' there. "The U.S. and Israel believe Iran is inflexible on the nuclear issue because it thinks it has the card of Hizbollah which it can play against Israel if military action is ever taken against its nuclear facilities. And I think that is why they decided to try and finish off Hizbollah," says the analyst.
The irony is that whenever Iran has sought to reach out to the U.S. and establish the framework for a 'grand bargain,' Washington has responded with silence or contempt. In 2003, when Mohammad Khatami was President, an approach was made to the Bush administration via the Swiss embassy in Tehran for a dialogue aimed at an eventual rapprochement. The letter, which apparently had the blessings of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, included an offer to accept the Saudi initiative for a two-state solution to the Palestinian question. But the White House threw it into the dustbin.
That document, with its formula of a grand bargain including recognition of Iran's rights and implicit recognition of Israel, was no flash in the pan. "If they accept our sovereign rights, we are prepared to make dialogue with any organization or any country," Dr. Mashaii told The Hindu. Asked whether that offer of dialogue included Israel as well, Dr. Mashaii repeated: "If the United Nations accepts our sovereign rights, we are ready to dialogue with any organization or country."
Anybody who knows Iran and its culture should understand it will never agree to suspend uranium enrichment under duress. The imposition of sanctions will make no difference but will only increase the clamor from neocons in the U.S. for air strikes and war. What the world needs is a creative political solution that respects Iran's rights and allays international concerns. The Europeans presented a package which seeks to bind Tehran to the NPT but which deliberately refrains from reaffirming Iran's inalienable right to nuclear energy in conformity with Article IV of that treaty. No doubt Iran will formulate a response. The international community should seek to build upon that response and keep the dialogue going.
* Siddharth Varadarajan is Associate Editor of The Hindu.
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Join the September 23 Action in DC!
The case of the Cuban Five has reached a crucial point. With the unjust denial of their latest appeal by the 11th Circuit Court, the political struggle to free the Five has taken on even greater -importance (see p. 4). Many of you have signed petitions, helped to organize events and contributed funds to win their freedom. For all those efforts we - and the Five - are most appreciative. Now we must ask for your support again.
In September, it will be eight years since the Cuban Five were arrested by the FBI. For eight years the Five have been unjustly imprisoned for the "crime" of risking their lives in order to stop violent terrorist attacks from the U.S. on Cuba.
September 2006 will also mark the 30th anniversary of the car-bomb murder in Washington, DC of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt by Cuban counter-revolutionaries working closely with the CIA. Letelier was Chile's ambassador to the U.S. during the time that Salvador Allende was president of Chile. After the bloody CIA coup, Letelier was a leading voice in exposing the crimes of the Pinochet regime and its U.S. backers. For speaking out, he and his aide, Ronni Moffitt, were assassinated.
Just two weeks after the murder of Letelier and Moffitt, the same terrorist network bombed a Cuban airliner in flight over Barbados, killing all 73 passengers aboard, on October 6, 1976.
It was to stop these kinds of horrific attacks that the Cuban Five - Gerardo Hernández, Ramón Labañino, Antonio Guerrero, Fernando González and René González - came to south Florida and infiltrated the terrorist groups which operate there with impunity.
On September 23, to commemorate the victims of 1976 and to demand freedom for the Cuban Five, we will be holding a march to the White House and a major public forum in Washington.
We are appealing to you to:
. Endorse the September 23 March and Public Forum.
. Come to Washington on September 23 and bring your organization, friends, co-workers or students.
. Help promote the march.
Now is the time for people to show their support for the Cuban Five. Come to Washington, DC for the march on the White House and help us demand that George W. Bush delay justice no further: Free the Cuban Five!
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Cuban Five Political Prisoners Opposed Terrorism
The Cuban Five, now entering their 9th year as political prisoners in the United States, are five men who were trying to stop terrorist groups in Miami from carrying out violent actions against the people of Cuba and others. Since 1959, these terrorist organizations have conducted bombings, assassinations and other sabotage, killing hundreds of innocent Cuban civilians. Groups like Alpha 66, Omega 7, Brothers to the Rescue, and Cuban American National Foundation have terrorized with impunity the Cuban people for years.
The Cuban people have been targets of U.S. policy, including a 43-year economic blockade designed to punish a whole people who have chosen a different road for building their society. They have been victims of terror attacks by the Miami-based mafia, many of whom came from the wealthy class that left Cuba after the popular overthrow of dictator Fulgencio Batista.
Gerardo Hernández, Antonio Guerrero, Ramón Labañino, René González and Fernando González, acting in defense of their people, were living in Miami, monitoring these terrorist groups to prevent future violence. The Five's actions were never directed at the U.S. government. The Five never harmed anyone and did not possess or use any weapons while in the United States.
But because the U.S. government - through the CIA - has played the principal role in funding, training and arming the Miami mafia, the FBI targeted the five Cubans instead of arresting the terrorists. The Cuban Five anti-terrorists were arrested September 12, 1998 and illegally held in solidarity confinement for 17 months in a Miami jail.
Their trial began in November 2000. With the seven-month trial based in Miami, a virtual witchhunt atmosphere existed. Defense attorneys' motions for a change of venue were denied five times by the judge, although it was obvious that a fair trial was impossible in that city.
In a blow to justice, the Cuban Five were convicted June 8, 2001 and sentenced in December 2001 to four life terms and 75 years.
It will be remembered that in early 2000, following their arrest and before their trial, the Miami mafia kidnapped five-year-old Elián González in an attempt to prevent him from returning to Cuba with his father. The months-long struggle to free young Elián González from the Miami mafia showed the true nature of these Mafia-type groups in Miami, who so cruelly tried to deny a father and his son their right to live together in their own country, simply because that country is Cuba. Terrorists like José Basulto and Ramón Saúl Sánchez, convicted of criminal acts, became "spokesmen" for the Miami family trying to block Elian from returning home. They did not succeed. The case of the Five was tried within all these conditions, making a fair trial impossible in Miami.
A Victory in Appeals, then a Surprise Reversal
On August 9, 2005, after seven years of unjust imprisonment, the Cuban Five won an important victory on appeal. A three-judge panel of the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals in Atlanta, in a unanimous decision, overturned the convictions of the Cuban Five and ordered a new trial outside of Miami.
However, the government refused to release the Five. Instead they kept them imprisoned and appealed the court ruling. In an unexpected and unusual move, on October 31, 2005, the 11th Circuit Court agreed to hear the U.S. prosecutors' appeal. Then on August 9, 2006, the full court overturned the unanimous decision of the three-judge panel. This action is considered unprecedented legally, given the unanimous decision by the three-judge panel, and their continued dissent with the majority decision.
Support for the Five is growing with actions planned in September. Join the struggle to free the Five!
From the National Committee to Free the Five and Radio Havana
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Statement from Cuba's Parliament on Cuban Five Case
The Constitutional and Judicial Affairs Commission of the National Assembly of the People's Power [Cuban Parliament] voices indignation over the decision of the Atlanta Federal Appeals Court, which, removed from judicial procedures, invalidated the unanimous decision of the panel of three judges that had declared null the trial that took place in Miami against Cuban Five anti-terrorist fighters Gerardo Hernandez, Ramon Labanino, Fernando Gonzalez, Rene Gonzalez and Antonio Guerrero.
The decision makes evident once again the political nature of the trial and the unjust measures adopted, the arbitrary behavior of the United States government, the violation of the U.S. Constitution and laws, and a breach of the most basic standards of law and specifically of human rights.
The magistrates of the panel, whose professional experience adds to more than 80 years, stated in a 93-page decision that "forming an (impartial) jury in this community (Miami) was less than probable due to the prejudice existing there. Therefore a new trial was ordered because of the perfect storm created when a wave of intense feelings from the community and widespread publicity before and during the trial combined with inappropriate references made by the prosecutor."
The decision adopted by the Atlanta court did not take into consideration the violent and intimidating environment existing in Miami, nor the most recent happenings in that city reported by the local media. Those included the seizing of weapons caches destined for terrorist -attacks against Cuba and public statements by terrorists who, with total impunity, recognized their acts. This confirmed the need for the monitoring work that the Cuban Five were carrying out to learn about the violent actions planned against Cuba by groups in Miami that have resulted in the death of innocent civilians. The revelations brought new and dramatic evidence in support of the defense's argument regarding the universal principal of the right of a state to defend itself.
The decision by the United Nations Human Rights Commission Working Group on Arbitrary Detentions has also been totally ignored. The commission ruled that taking into consideration the events and circumstances under which the trial took place, the nature of the charges against the accused, and the severe sentences imposed on them, the trail was not held in a climate of objectivity and impartiality that is required to comply with the standards of a fair trial as defined by Article 14 of the International Convention of Civil and Political Rights. The commission further declared the detention of the Cuban Five as arbitrary, and called upon the government of the United States to immediately remedy the situation by restoring the rights that they have been deprived.
We denounce this infamous and ignominious decision and call upon legislators around the world and on all peace-loving people to join this noble cause, to demand that the U.S. government immediately release the Cuban Five, who fought against terrorism to preserve the life and peace of the Cuban people and the people of the United States as well. By September, they will have spent eight years of unjust imprisonment, with great limitations on visits by their relatives, including two of them who have not been able to see their wives.
The International Campaign to Free the Cuban Five, from September 12 to October 6, will serve to continue and increase the struggle for truth and justice for our brothers and for the development of a wide-reaching movement among law makers and in the legal community so that the universal principles of law prevail and make possible these patriots' return to Cuba.
Granma, August 15, 2006
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